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istory cannot be relived, but it is worth 
studying for what we can learn from it that can 
be applied to the present and the future. This 
essay explores several lines of thought in respect to 
Georgia's independence, both its frustrated attempt in 
1918, and its recent successful transition to 
independence as a result of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Nothing said here is intended as a definitive 
judgment. The purpose of the essay is to stimulate 
discussion, debate, and reflection.
Georgia as Part of the Russian Empire 
Georgia's absorption into the Russian Empire was a 
several-stage process. Russian interest in Georgia 
began at the end of the 16th century when the tsars 
became increasingly concerned with expansion into the 
Middle East.1 The Georgian principalities, under 
pressure from the Ottoman and Persian empires, fell 
into disarray in the 18th century. The united Kingdoms 
of Kartli and Kakheti accepted Russian protection in 
1783. Less than two decades later protection turned 
into absorption.2 During the first quarter of the 19th 
century all Georgian lands became part of the Russian 
Empire. It was a classic colonial process. Like the 
other major states of Europe, Russia invested a great 
deal of military, political, and economic energy in 
expansion of its colonial empire.
The major difference between Russia and other 
colonial powers was that Russia expanded into 
contiguous territories rather than overseas. This was 
Georgia's misfortune, but there was also a positive side. 
As part of a large, modernizing state, Georgia was able 
to participate in a process of development that might
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have been much slower and both politically and 
economically more difficult if it had fought to maintain 
a precarious independence. Georgia received more 
investment during Russian imperial times than many 
more distant parts of the empire, including regions of 
Russia itself. By the end of the 19th century Georgia 
had reached a stage of economic develop-
ment—spurred by the discovery of oil in neighboring 
Azerbaijan—that did not differ greatly from that of 
other southern European countries. The population 
increased rapidly and the natural vigor of the Georgian 
people expressed itself in a rapid increase of literacy 
and flowering of literature and art. Georgia's ancient 
cultural traditions made it relatively invulnerable to the 
most negative features of Russification. There was, of 
course, an oppressive side to Russia's domination of 
Georgia. The Georgian Church lost its independence, 
Georgians were required to play a supporting role in 
Russian military conquests in the North Caucasus and 
in campaigns against the Ottoman Empire—reinforcing 
a historic legacy of hostility toward Islam. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, many Georgians concerned 
with progress and reform attracted the suspicion of 
tsarist authorities and suffered oppression, prison, and 
exile.
Nevertheless, as Georgia's population steadily grew, 
the quality of life improved. Infrastructure was greatly 
expanded—railroads were built, highways extended, 
electricity introduced. Contacts with Europe increased 
steadily and were not all mediated through Russia. 
During the last four decades of the Russian Empire, 
Georgia began to attract significant investment from 
abroad. As a result of the last Russo-Turkish war in 
1876-78, the ancient Georgian region of Ajaria was 
reunited with Georgia and Batumi soon grew from a 





Unlike some of the other imperial powers, however, 
Russia did comparatively little to prepare its colonies 
for self-administration, let alone independent existence. 
Nevertheless, as Russian society became more open 
after the reforms of the mid- and late 19th century, 
Georgia shared in these developments and political 
groups began to form. Thus, to the question—Was 
Georgia ready for independence when the Russian 
Empire collapsed in 1917?—an unequivocal answer 
can be given: yes. Georgia compared favorably with 
the countries of eastern Europe that became 
independent from the 1820s onward—Greece, Serbia, 
Romania, and Bulgaria, all as a result of European and 
Russian pressure on the Ottoman Empire; and it also 
compared favorably with those that gained 
independence with the collapse of the Russian and 
Austro-Hungarian empires as a result of World War 
I—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and Yugoslavia.3
Like all these countries, and to a greater degree than 
some, Georgia had developed politically to the point 
where it had a lively political life and was capable of 
self-government. Economically it had reached a level 
of development which could sustain independence and 
provide the foundation on which increased prosperity 
and social development could be based. 
Psychologically the fast-moving course of events from 
March 1917 to the spring of 1918 brought Georgia to 
a stage where the major portion of its population was 
enthusiastic about independence and ready to accept 
the responsibilities of existence as a full-fledged 
member of the international community.
The situation was not clear-cut, of course. Many 
factors came into play. I will mention only a few of 
them. Russia did not administer Georgia as a national 
entity. Georgians had not thought much about 
independence during the 19th century. The dominant 
Mensheviks until a very late stage of their evolution 
saw themselves as part of an all-Russian (and even 
worldwide) socialist movement for political 
liberalization and reform.4 Most Georgians had found
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their place in the Russian Empire, taken advantage of 
opportunities it offered for cultural and economic 
development, and tended to see Russia as a guarantor 
against designs on the Caucasus which Ottoman 
Turkey might still harbor. Russia's collapse shocked 
Georgians into realization that their geopolitical 
situation had drastically changed.5 While the sizable 
Georgian aristocracy had become partly Russianized, 
nationalism had grown among the lower classes in 
Georgia, but the bourgeoisie was still underdeveloped. 
Armenians to a great extent constituted the urban 
bourgeoisie of Georgia.
History, Russian divide-and-rule politics, as well as 
political and economic evolution during the 19th 
century, laid the basis for potential ethnic problems in 
Georgia. None of these was more serious than those 
with which newly independent East European countries 
had to contend after World War I: Jews, Ukrainians 
and Lithuanians in Poland; Germans in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Romania; Hungarians in all the 
countries surrounding truncated Hungary; Turks and 
other Muslims in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. And if one 
compares Georgia in 1918 with the overwhelming 
majority of the countries that became independent in 
the great wave of decolonization that occurred in the 
two decades after World War II, there can be no doubt 
that by these standards Georgia was fully qualified for 
independence in 1918.
Experience in the Soviet Empire
But it was not to be. It was Russia that was not 
prepared for the independence of any of its colonial 
possessions. World War I caused three empires to 
collapse: the Russian, the Ottoman, and the Austro- 
Hungarian. The evil genius of Lenin brought the 
Russian Empire back to life as the Soviet Union, thus 
doing great damage to Russia and delaying its evolution 
into the modern world by 70 years. Meanwhile 
Austrians and Turks abandoned all thought of 
recreating their empires and concentrated on 
developing modern nation-states.
Destruction of Georgian independence by Russia 
was accomplished by a combination of conspiracy and 
military force. Independent Georgia was fortunate in 
having coherent leadership under Noe Jordania and his
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colleagues, but the task of steering the country through 
the conflicting forces that surrounded it at the end of 
World War I was beyond their skill and ingenuity. For 
a brief period Germany appeared to provide a solution 
and the period of German occupation of Georgia stands 
out as a time of hope. But Germany was in the process 
of being defeated. The efforts Germany made at Brest- 
Litovsk to protect Georgia's independence came to 
nothing. A century of Russian rule left the countries of 
the South Caucasus incapable of cooperating 
effectively to mutual advantage. Bolshevik Russia 
undermined each in succession. Revolution in Turkey 
worked to Georgia's disadvantage, though the new 
Turkish republic later evolved as a positive factor for 
Georgia. By the beginning of 1921 the tide of history 
had turned hopelessly against Georgia. Nevertheless 
the country put up strong resistance to Russian military 
conquest and seizure of power by the communist party 
was never approved by a majority of the Georgian 
people.
What did Georgia gain and what did she lose from 
70 years as a Soviet Socialist Republic? There was 
further development of infrastructure and industry, but 
it was a dubious gain—all such development was 
according to Russian and Soviet priorities imposed 
from Moscow. Thus Georgia found itself in 1991 with 
a distorted economic structure and unprofitable 
industries without a market. Agriculture, too, suffered 
from collectivization and priorities set for Moscow's 
advantage. Georgia lost the ability to feed itself. 
Agroindustry operated under priorities that did not 
correspond to Georgia's needs. Georgia suffered from 
being a frontier region of the Soviet Union, where 
enormous investment was made in military installations 
that absorbed local resources for support and 
contributed nothing to the Georgian economy. 
Georgians took advantage of Soviet stress on education 
and training, however, to gain the highest level of 
literacy in the Soviet Union and produce a population 
well equipped with basic knowledge and skills. They 
also took advantage of opportunities for cultural 
development and historic preservation. Their church 
resisted Soviet suppression of religion long enough to 
emerge strong and effective as collapse of the Soviet 
system neared.
Georgians lost most of their contacts with the outer 
world during the Soviet period. They lost the 
opportunity to participate in international affairs except 
as Soviet proxies. Georgian men had to fight in Soviet 
wars and serve in Soviet armed forces that had no
relationship to the basic interests of Georgia. 
Georgians who were judged enemies of the Soviet 
system were repeatedly purged, exiled, and killed. 
Georgians thus gained no experience in true self-
administration or in open political life. They became 
skilled in manipulation of the Soviet political system 
for temporary advantage, and parallel exploitation of 
the economic system. They learned how to survive.
On the Threshold of Independence
The qualified gains Georgia made during the Soviet 
period became less and less valuable as the Soviet 
Union neared collapse. In 1990 Georgians found 
themselves enthusiastic about independence but lacked 
a civil society and leaders with skill in politics and 
knowledge of how to lead and govern. The country 
had a deteriorated infrastructure and industry that was 
barely functional. Every aspect of economic and 
financial life had to be revised, rethought, and 
reformed. Was Georgia prepared for independence in 
1990-91 ? Psychologically, yes, but in almost all other 
respects it was less well prepared than in 1918.
Georgians proved, however, to have great reserves 
of endurance, intelligence, and resourcefulness. They 
were able to live through a period of crisis as serious as 
any part of the former Soviet Union had to face. They 
withstood efforts by incompetent adventurers as well as 
Russian neo-communists and militarist-nationalists to 
divide the country and plunge it into civil war. Coping 
with crisis, Georgia produced leaders ready to take 
great risks to set the country on a positive course of 
development. Strong Georgian sentiments and 
traditions had not been destroyed by the Soviet 
experience. They had not been destroyed in Edward 
Shevardnadze even by service as the Soviet Union's 
Foreign Minister.
If Georgia was not well prepared for independence 
in 1990-91, it had another enormous advantage over 
1918: its international situation was far more favorable. 
There was no Turkish threat to fear as in 1918. Turkey 
was fully supportive of Georgian independence and 
quickly became one of Georgia's closest and strongest 
friends. Europe and America were not crippled by a 
long war or equivocal about Georgia, as they were in 
1918. Georgia received both sympathy and support 
from all major Western countries, including reunified 
Germany. In 1918 the international system was so 
weakly developed that Georgia could not rely on the 
kind of assistance it received, and continues to receive, 
from the United Nations, the World Bank, the
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International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and 




So Georgia's prospects for maintaining its 
independence are enormously better at the end of the 
20th century than they were 80 years earlier. The 
country has already stabilized itself politically to the 
point where it is judged as the most successful of post- 
Soviet states. It is also judged the most democratic. In 
recent years it has had the highest rate of economic 
growth of any ex-Soviet country. It has made excellent 
progress reforming its agriculture and a good beginning 
on its industry. Its relations with both other ex-Soviet 
states and its neighbors to the south and west are strong 
and largely devoid of tensions. Are there threats to 
Georgian independence? Unfortunately, Russia remains 
a threat.
Though many of Russia's younger leaders show 
strong evidence of commitment to turning Russia into 
a full-fledged, responsible member of the community 
of nations—i.e., a non-aggressive nation-state—and 
though there is little evidence of virulent nationalism 
surviving among the Russian people as a whole, .there 
are groups in Russia that are unreconciled to the loss of 
the Empire. In other ex-imperial countries survivors of 
this kind have dwindled to an insignificant minority 
who are no more harmful than people who believe that 
the world is flat. But in Russia such people are still 
plentiful and vocal. They seem unable to understand 
that Russian power has evaporated. The disastrous 
Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan followed by utter 
failure in Chechnya has left the Russian military forces 
crippled. They are unlikely to recover for at least a 
decade.6 Nevertheless we still hear loud voices from 
Russia advocating restoration of Russian control over 
her former colonies and reestablishment of the 
Russian/Soviet Empire.
Neo-Imperialism in Russia
No region arouses more resentment among 
unreformed Russians than the Caucasus, and no region 
of the Russian Federation today is more problematic 
than the North Caucasus. It is Georgia's misfortune to 
be located directly to the south and to be infected by 
some of the same instability, which Russians abet. 
Russia has yet to develop a comprehensive policy 
toward the North Caucasus. Nor does Russia have an 
honest policy toward the independent nations of the 
South Caucasus. For lack of anything better, it slips 
into the old divide-and-rule approach.7
Officially, relations between Yeltsin's government 
in Moscow and Georgia are being conducted according 
to recognized international procedures. But there are 
many disquieting aspects to the situation that raise 
serious questions: is Yeltsin's government honest about 
its official position vis-a-vis Georgia? Is it fully in 
control of all the elements formally responsible to it: 
the military, the FSB (successor to the KGB), the 
Foreign Ministry, other ministries? There are several 
disquieting problems:
• Despite repeated promises, Russia has 
brought no significant pressure on the 
breakaway Abkhaz leaders to enter into 
serious talks with Georgia. Russia continues 
to supply Abkhazia with essential goods and 
services without which it could not exist in its 
present condition.
• Russian military installations in Georgia 
continue to operate extraterritorially, without 
Georgian supervision, and at times contrary to 
Georgian national interests.
• Russia has failed to investigate repeated 
incidents of terrorism against Georgian 
officials, including President Shevardnadze 
himself when evidence implicates Russians in 
these actions. Georgian citizens sought for 
suspicion of involvement in such incidents 
enjoy asylum and freedom of movement in 
Russia.
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The most regrettable thing about Russian behavior 
toward Georgia is that it is difficult to see how 
harassment of Georgia and attempts to destabilize the 
country benefit Russia.8 Russia would gain much more 
from following the example of other ex-imperial 
powers toward their colonies: constructive engagement. 
Russia would gain from cooperative economic 
relationships with Georgia. It would gain from 
professional and intellectual contacts and exchanges as 
well. Interrelationships between Georgia and Russia 
are deep and extensive. Russia has more to lose than 
Georgia does from a posture of negativism and 
hostility.
Could Russia Reconquer Georgia?
There is very little likelihood that Russia could 
reconquer Georgia. Russia is too weak. Its capabilities 
are limited to harassment, interference and "spoiling." 
Georgia must remain alert to protect itself. It must 
continue to seek the support of the international 
community in bringing pressure on Russia to adopt a 
more constructive policy toward the Caucasus—not 
simply in the interest of Caucasians, but in the interest 
of Russians themselves. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has 
repeatedly stressed, a Russia that devotes its energies to 
re-acquisition of an empire, will condemn itself to 
permanent second- or third-rate status among the 
nations of the world. A Russia that concentrates its 
energies on evolving into an open, democratic society 
committed to improving the well-being of its people, 
has the resources to repeat the experience of former 
totalitarian countries such as Italy, Germany, and 
Japan.9
G
eorgia was capable of existing as an 
independent nation and responsible member of 
the international community in 1918 when it 
first declared independence. Its reabsorption into the 
Russian/Soviet Empire delayed its political 
development and did comparatively little for its 
economic development, but the country has been 
psychologically ready for independence throughout the 
twentieth century.
Georgia has one of the oldest continuing 
civilizations in the world. It was one of the first 
nations to adopt Christianity. It has shown a 
remarkable capacity to endure confusion and hardship 
and survive to flourish. It deserves a place in the 
civilized community of nations. The Soviet experience 
left Georgia with physical and human problems that 
continue to require energy and time to overcome. The 
international climate at the end of the 20th century is 
vastly more favorable to Georgia's situation than it was 
in 1918-21. Georgia can look forward to the 21st 
century as a time of greater development of its national 
life than ever before in its long history.
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A
 cottage industry of scholarly publications has 
ensured that the Mensheviks have not ended 
up in Trotsky's “dustbin of history.” Indeed, 
the Mensheviks and Menshevism have acquired a 
particularly coherent profile in Soviet, post-Soviet and 
Western historiography. Scholars often pay lip service 
to the recent genesis of the revolutionary parties and 
the accompanying weakness of party identities, to the 
mercurial nature of popular support for these parties, 
and to the alienating effects of the long periods of exile 
of most of their leaders. Still, most studies nonetheless 
treat the immediate pre- and post-revolutionary period 
in Russia as a battleground of competing and largely 
coherent political parties. In the case of the 
Mensheviks and Menshevism, this interest was fuelled 
by a political argument most energetically driven first 
by the Cold War and then by glasnost-inspired 
reevaluations of the Soviet past: a belief in paths not 
taken in 1917, in viable, coherent alternatives 
prematurely and brutally crushed by the soon-to-be 
Stalinist regime. The Mensheviks have become in 
Western historiography (and increasingly among post- 
Soviet historians) the alternative par excellence, the 
“conscience” of the revolution. Forced into the 
emigration, they are center-stage as the Greek chorus to 
the unfolding tragedy of Soviet Russia.
In this prodigiously researched and ambitious book,
Liebich offers a rather different approach. His focus is 
the intimate and often fractious Menshevik “family” of 
intellectuals, most notably the Menshevik 
Internationals who gathered around Iulii Martov in the 
emigration. Fleeing persecution, this group would 
move from Russia, to Berlin, Paris and finally New 
York City in a tragic odyssey that would span four 
decades but never bring them home again. The title 
notwithstanding, however, a full third of this book is 
devoted to the pre-emigration period. Liebich offers a 
wonderfully indeterminate picture of Menshevik 
identity at the very top of the party, a picture surely 
even more applicable to the rank-and-file which saw 
"no sense to the ideological wrangling [among the 
leaders of the RSDRP]" (54). He resists the traditional 
historiographical practice of sketching his Mensheviks
along clear "factional lines of continuity" (59) from the 
prewar to the postrevolutionary period, preferring 
instead to blur the lines between the Bolshevik and 
Menshevik factions. He notes that the stance adopted 
during the First World War was a more reliable 
indicator of "subsequent individual and factional self-
definition" (60). As such, he suggests that problems 
exist with traditional approaches that deal 
unproblematically with the Mensheviks and 
Menshevism as coherent and identifiable categories 
(and, by implication, he raises questions about the 
categories of Bolshevik and Bolshevism as well).
This intentional indeterminacy informs and benefits 
this work. It helps explain his unusually moderate 
picture of Menshevik persecution under Soviet power, 
the Mensheviks, he argues, enjoying a "curiously 
privileged position" (88) presumably deriving from the 
often close relationships leading Mensheviks had 
shared with leading Bolsheviks. His close readings of 
the often bitter and fractious quarrels within the 
Menshevik family abroad leave the impression that 
these Mensheviks did not represent any realistic 
“alternative” to the Bolshevik path at any time 
(notwithstanding Liebich’s concluding remarks hoping 
for a revival of alternativnost' as a "fruitful heuristic 
device" (329) for historians of Soviet Russia). Finally, 
their own conviction that their very legitimacy 
depended on the vitality of their ties inside Soviet 
Russia, combined with a deep identification with 
certain aspects of the Soviet project, ensured that their 
readings of events inside Soviet Russia were not 
always apposite. Stalin's revolution bewildered them 
and Stalin the man "remained a mystery to them" (251), 
even generating in these old revolutionaries a certain 
"nostalgia for the old Bolshevik Party, for the party of 
Lenin, and perhaps even for the party of Trotsky" 
(251). As Liebich implies, their commentaries on 
events inside Soviet Russia revealed more about them 
than about the object of their study. His analysis of the 
often difficult relationship between the shifting events 
inside Soviet Russia and the fundamental philosophical 
and ideological views of these emigres is fascinating.
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After two decades in the emigration, they would again 
find themselves split, this time formally and 
irrevocably, over Soviet Russia and the viability of the 
socialist project. Led in its final years by idiosyncratic 
and often difficult survivors, the Menshevik family 
became preoccupied with how it would be remembered 
by posterity.
While Liebich undercuts the traditional reasons for 
studying these Mensheviks, his work nonetheless 
contains very good reasons why they should not be 
ignored (beyond the fact that his story is fascinating 
and engaging in its own right). First, despite his stated 
reluctance in a footnote (p. 346) to evaluate the 
Menshevik influence on Soviet historiography, he does 
so on several occasions. He documents Menshevik 
efforts in focusing international attention on the gulag; 
he traces quite specifically to individual Mensheviks 
the application of the term "totalitarian" to Soviet 
Russia; he notes the development of the “discipline” of 
kremlinology, Boris Nicolaevsky's "trademark," which, 
as he notes, would "become the tool of an entire 
profession" (302). Liebich thus unwittingly makes the 
case for a much more systematic analysis of the 
Mensheviks' role in shaping the very terms and 
categories long used to conceive of Soviet society. 
Second, the role of European Social Democracy and 
especially of the Labor and Socialist International in 
helping to shape these categories also deserves more 
systematic scrutiny, particularly as it was, in Liebich's 
own view, the "principal multilateral forum for the 
promotion of Menshevik views" (166) from the 
Hamburg Congress in 1923 to the fall of France in 
1940.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, while 
Liebich's work is very much an analysis of the 
Menshevik view of Soviet Russia, it is also 
occasionally suggestive of the self-identification 
project in which these emigres were engaged. "There 
is a tendency," he writes at one point, "toward 
introversion in every exile group, if only for reasons of 
collective self-preservation and identity" (103). 
Indeed, the very categories of Menshevik and 
Menshevism might be viewed rather as an extended 
process of self-definition that was intimately linked 
with a similar process of Bolshevik self-definition in 
Russia after 1917. In some ways, the Mensheviks 
might be seen as the “imagined community” par 
excellence. The author, for example, argues that the 
readership of the Menshevik journal Sotsialisticheskii 
vestnik "may be seen as the real constituency of the
RSDRP after 1921-22" (129), and that the journal 
would ultimately become "the only manifestation of the 
party's existence" (100). In such an approach, certain 
issues which are dealt with only tangentially or 
anecdotally by Liebich would acquire enormous 
influence: the polemics both inside and outside of 
Soviet Russia over the term “Menshevism” (more could 
be done with the Menshevik trial of 1931, for example, 
in this vein); the creation and institutionalization of the 
Menshevik archive; the embrace of these Mensheviks 
initially by European Social Democracy and later by 
the American academy, which can be seen as a 
formative factor in this process of (re)creating Russian 
Social Democracy as a principled stand against 
Bolshevik maximalism. That this term can serve 
apparently without irony as the subtitle for this study of 
a small group of emigre intellectuals says much about 
their success (with the support of other actors) in 
profiling themselves as a coherent and articulate 
political entity larger than the sum of its parts. It is 
testament to the power and influence of this group, and 
broadens our notions of what political power is and 
how it might be exercised.
This complex and ambitious work is essential 
reading for anyone interested in these intellectuals both 
before and after the revolution. That it is also highly 
suggestive of other ways of thinking of the Mensheviks 
and Menshevism is testament to the reach and 
significance of the arguments contained therein.
Frederick Corney is Assistant Professor of History at 
the University of Florida. He is completing his book 
manuscript entitled, "Writing October: Memory and 
the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1927.”
32
